Individuation, Responsiveness, Translation: Heidegger’s Ethics by Nelson, Eric S.
269F. Schalow (ed.), Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking:  
Essays in Honor of Parvis Emad, Contributions To Phenomenology 65,  
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1649-0_14, © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
[T]he transcendence of Dasein’s being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the 
necessity of the most radical individuation (GA 2, p. 51).1
aletheuein (άlhq∈ύ∈in) means to be disclosing, to remove the world from concealedness 
and coveredness. And that is a mode of being of human Dasein. It appears first of all in 
speaking, in speaking with one another, in legein (lέg∈in).2
1  Introduction
Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time has been repeatedly criticized for ignoring the 
social and ethical dimensions of human existence. After discussing the possibility 
of an “ethics of individuation” based on passages from The Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics, I argue that Heidegger is not concerned with developing a social or 
moral philosophy as such but with the question of how individuation (Vereinzelung), 
within the horizon of the question of being (Sein), is possible given the predominance 
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Time. Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) and Being 
and Time. Translated by Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY University Press, 1996).
2 Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992c). Plato’s Sophist, trans. 
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of the social and the fallenness of the public sphere.3 The priority of the question 
concerning the individuation of Dasein – and its explication through the alterity of 
uncanniness, facticity, and death in relation to the identity of tradition and the “they” 
(das Man) – provides a basis for rethinking the significance of the ethical in Being 
and Time, especially in light of Heidegger’s earlier venture of a hermeneutics of 
facticity and related works of the late 1920s. Insofar as Heidegger unfolds the fini-
tude and facticity of the ethical, as a question to which ethical thinking needs to 
respond, Heidegger intimates an ethics of facticity. In the conclusion, I consider the 
implications of such an ethics and responsibility for issues of language and transla-
tion in Heidegger’s thinking.
Heidegger’s reversal of ethics in Being and Time is not done in the name of 
another ethical position or view, such as egoism, nor for the sake of the unethical. 
It is instead a performance and staging of the very question of ethics in its facticity. 
Heidegger interrogates ethics as embodied in tradition and everyday life in order to 
disclose possibilities that remain hidden in discourses appealing to axioms, princi-
ples, values, and virtues.4 These unnoticed and suppressed possibilities are inti-
mated in Heidegger’s discussions of the existential structures of Dasein such as 
conscience, guilt, solicitude, or concern for others, and care. The coming to freedom 
and responsibility involved in the individuation of human being-there – with its 
threefold equiprimordial structure of being-itself, being-with others (Mitsein), and 
being-amidst things – occurs or is enacted as a response to the facticity of one’s own 
existence, especially as disclosed in the inescapability of one’s death.
2  Ethics and Individuation
In investigating the significance of individuation in Heidegger, we are confronted 
with the initial problem that it is habitually not seen as an issue at all. Individuation 
is already self-evident, since we are all already individuals. If it is questioned at all, 
it is interpreted as the particularization of a universal, the instantiation of a type, 
differentiation according to a category, and affiliation with or alienation from some 
3 I retain “fallenness” as a translation of Verfallenheit, because (1) the word does not mean “falling 
prey” and (2) Heidegger intentionally transforms reified theological concepts, such as conscience, 
fallenness, and guilt by phenomenologically relating them to concrete phenomena.
4 My reading departs from interpretations of Heidegger that define ethics in an exclusively limited 
and negative sense. Gail Stenstad, for instance, suggests that Heidegger’s thinking has no ethical 
dimension and that imputing any ethics would violate “what Heidegger’s thinking is trying to 
accomplish.” However, even as she rejects ethics as derivative and useless theorizing, as the oppo-
site of dwelling, she discusses claims that have a broader ethical dimension, such as holding one-
self open to what is, listening and responding to things, etc., or that have a tacit ethical dimension 
insofar as being open, listening to, and dwelling with things suggests an ethos (e˝qoV), accustomed 
place, or way of life rather than a secondary ontic fact of human existence. See Transformations: 
Thinking After Heidegger (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), especially 183–185, 
197–198.
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given authority or identity. It is accordingly either reduced to numerical, physical 
and spatial differentiation or a belonging to a pregiven genus or fixed essence for 
which “becoming oneself” is a redundant question.
For Heidegger, the question of individuation is an issue concerning not “what” 
but “who” one is. It is bound up with the enigma of how the self can know itself in 
its facticity, that is, that which resists the self and its appropriations, including its 
own self, compelling factical-life to interpret and translate itself. Heidegger 
described such questions, in which the self questions itself concerning itself and as 
a whole (GA 29/30, p. 20), as existential or metaphysical.5 They disclose myself as 
a question to myself.
Heidegger’s employment of the German word Vereinzelung (individuation) sug-
gests a break or separation involved in “becoming one” or in being reduced onto 
oneself. Although they need not coincide in ordinary German, Heidegger identifies 
Vereinzelung with loneliness and solitude (Einsamkeit) in The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics:
This individuation is rather the solitariness in which each human being first of all enters 
into a nearness to what is essential in all things, a nearness to world. What is this solitude, 
where each human being will be as though unique? (GA 29/30, p. 8).
Why does this individuation, the singularity that is not just a particular instance 
of the universal in being as though unique, require solitude? In this need, is it noth-
ing but a flight and escapism, such as that attributed to the Daoist hermit, into the 
illusory tranquility of the rural solitude of some mountain stream or forest path? 
Perhaps. Yet more significantly, for Heidegger, solitude is a condition not of escap-
ing the world but of encountering it. Solitariness is a prerequisite of individuation 
because the latter breaks with the constant noise of normal indifference in order to 
near and hear the world. Individuation is a kind of transcendence (GA 2, p. 51), a 
stepping out of oneself toward the world. The break of immanence (transcendence) 
is necessary for the happening of a “step back from” that is equally a “stepping out 
into” and allowing to be seen. Solitude, as separation from participation in the con-
tinuous hum of everydayness, is the breakdown of connection through encountering 
finitude. The uniqueness of self and things does not arise from the imposition of a 
view, prescription or imperative (i.e., “ethics” in the traditional sense) but emerges 
in the “indicative,” self-disclosing moment of “coming into one’s own” – which 
even in his early lecture-courses is not merely an ontic occurrence – of letting world 
be encountered and said (i.e., “ethics” in a phenomenological sense).6
5 Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, GA 29/30 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1992). The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill and 
Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).
6 Parvis Emad speaks of “linguistic event” in the context of Heidegger’s later thinking in, “Thinking 
More Deeply into the Question of Translation: Essential Translation and the Unfolding of 
Language,” in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), p. 333. For a defense of translating Heidegger’s early use of Ereignis also 
as “coming into one’s own,” see Parvis Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to 
Philosophy (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), pp. 25–26.
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As a response to finitude, including the facticity that one is, individuation is a 
becoming finite. Since finitude is the way in which humans exist or dwell, it is not a 
mere “fact” about human nature. Nor is encountering one’s own finitude equivalent to 
idealistically reducing the world to the ego and its concerns, as such egoism is part of 
the average everydayness that is in question. On the contrary, according to Heidegger:
Finitude is not some property that is merely attached to us, but is our fundamental way of 
being. If we wish to become what we are, we cannot abandon this finitude or deceive 
ourselves about it, but must safeguard it. Such preservation is the innermost process of our 
being finite, i.e., it is our innermost becoming finite. Finitude only is in truly becoming finite. 
In becoming finite, however, there ultimately occurs an individuation of man with respect to 
his Dasein. Individuation – this does not mean that man clings to his frail little ego that puffs 
itself up against something or other which it takes to be the world (GA 29/30, p. 8).
This taking-up, safeguarding, and preserving of finitude can be seen as an “ethics 
of finitude.” It is not ethics in the standard sense of prescribing universal rules and 
systems of axioms, values, or virtues to follow, since Heidegger rejected “ethics” as 
legislation and calculation. Such an ethics is not about the formation of a set of 
values, world-view, or ideology at all, much less some supposed “spiritual” and 
“cultural” warfare, but opening up their questionability in exposing the self to its 
world. The possibility of this ethics should be separated from (while confronting) 
Heidegger’s own “fallen” ideological engagement, which was perhaps due to blind-
ness to the pervasiveness and power of ideology and value thinking.
The early Heidegger’s emphasis on the transformative moment – or singularization – 
of coming into one’s own (i.e., in his early usage of words such as Ereignis and 
Geschehen) and renewal in performative enactment (Vollzug), in contrast with the 
dominion of custom and opinion that passes things along, allows responding to the 
world out of its openness and givenness anew. Destructuring is introduced in order 
to attempt to trace that which throws views, values, and constructs into question in 
order to let the world, self, and other be encountered. This is not ethics in the con-
ventional sense of legislating laws, moralizing about virtues, or prescribing values. 
However, it is deeply ethical in that such confrontation engages and potentially 
releases its own tradition, historicity, hermeneutical situation, and generation. The 
prospect of such a phenomenological ethics depends on whether individuation, as a 
break that opens and discloses other possibilities for dwelling, is even thinkable.7
3  Indifference and Individuation
The orienting issue of Being and Time is the meaning and truth of being. Yet rather 
than providing a classical philosophical analysis of being, or ontology, Heidegger 
interrogates the meaning of being via the issue of that being who examines its own 
7 On the possibility of a different ethos and poetics of responsive dwelling, and its environmental 
significance, see E. S. Nelson, “Responding to Heaven and Earth: Daoism, Heidegger and Ecology,” 
Environmental Philosophy, 1/2 (Fall 2004): 65–74.
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way or mode of being. Being and Time asks the question of being but does so by 
addressing that being which questions itself. He calls this being, which we in each 
case are, Dasein. Far from being the philosophical anthropology that Husserl feared, 
much less an encyclopedic or systematic account of human nature, Heidegger’s 
analytic of Dasein focused on a sparse number of aspects of human existence and in 
an eccentric way from the perspective of modern social philosophy. Heidegger did 
not begin with the individual as an essence or atomic fact from which to construct 
society through power, markets, contracts, and convents. His analysis takes as its 
point of departure Dasein in its “neutrality,” in what he calls the “indifference” of 
everydayness, and proceeds to examine situations that broach the significance 
of being and the self by placing this indifference in question.
Average everyday life is not indifferent in the Kantian sense of being disinter-
ested or Stoic impartiality. It is not the absolute indifference experienced in pro-
found boredom, unconcerned with all affairs, which Heidegger described in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Instead, through its self-interested concern 
with everyday things and affairs, it is indifferent to that which would throw light on 
character and of the plight of its own existence. It is in these situations, where the 
everyday and the ordinary become questionable, that the grip of everyday indiffer-
ence is broken. The difference indicated in this breaking, in which the “one” of the 
“they” (das Man) is doubled into two in order to become the “one” of oneself 
(vereinzelt), is the possibility of individuation. Individuation as the break with 
indifference can take place because Dasein’s neutrality is already broken by the 
facticity of its existence: “The being that we in each case are, the human is in its 
essence neutral. We call this being Dasein. Yet it belongs to what is ownmost to 
neutral Dasein that it has a necessarily broken neutrality, insofar as it in each case 
factically exists” (GA 27, p. 146) [trans. modified].8
The transition from being lost in the facticity of the indifference, conformity, and 
compulsion of the “they” (das Man) to the self-individuation involved in what 
Heidegger calls authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) requires that the self can be a question 
to and for itself precisely in and through its facticity. Heidegger accordingly con-
tends in §9 that the analytic of Dasein cannot begin with Dasein in its difference, 
qua actually existing concrete individual, but rather with its common indifference or 
averageness. For Heidegger, Dasein’s being “must be developed from the existenti-
ality of its existence. This cannot mean, however, that ‘Dasein’ is to be construed 
from out of a concrete possible idea of existence. At the outset of our analysis, it is 
particularly important that Dasein should not be interpreted in the difference of a 
definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered in its indifferent character 
which it is proximally and for the most part. This indifference is not nothing, but a 
positive phenomenal characteristic of this being” (GA 2, p. 58, emphasis added). 
Although the goal of the analytic of Dasein will be Dasein in its difference (indi-
viduation), its factical possibilities (existence) are not straightforwardly available in 
average everydayness.
8 Heidegger, Einleitung in die Philosophie, GA 27 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2001).
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Difference remains invisible to the indifference of the “they.”9 Average ordinary 
life dwells in the familiarity of its self-understanding without seeing its possibilities 
or hearing “who” (not “that”) it is. The familiarity and compulsion of common life 
presents itself as certain, obvious, and unquestionable. In this context of conven-
tional hearing, and reading, “we hear only what we already understand.”10 This 
habitual and customary reproduction of power in our very senses was analyzed by 
Adorno, in the context of music and – needless to say – from a different perspective, 
as a retrogression in hearing as listeners are transformed into consumers.11 Such 
everyday hearing is all the more coercive, however, because it is not merely super-
imposed by an external system upon the “innocent” lifeworld, and hence easily 
correctable through a new consensus, but already comprises the fabric of the every-
day lifeworld itself. Although Heidegger was not interested in ideology-critique or 
prescribing “ownedness” as a normative end or standard, since he rejected ethics 
and critique in this sense, his thought still has consequences for such thinking given 
this account of inherent non-innocence of everydayness. Dominion achieved through 
the public sphere and civil society, through everyday beliefs and practices, is conse-
quently much more unquestioned and pervasive than any hegemony based on insti-
tutions alone.
It is repeatedly forgotten that fallenness, according to the logic of temporaliza-
tion at work in Being and Time, is not so much spatial – fallen from heaven – as it is 
temporal. Everyday existence is not simply a “social reality” but is itself a mode of 
being in time, it is fallenness into the present. For fallen everydayness, according to 
its temporality of existing in the present without encountering the moment, every-
thing is an extension of its own present. Although it understands and lives the past 
and future as mere extensions of the present, and as guaranteed by history, memo-
rial, and progress, the absolutized perspective of the present is itself historically 
formed and finite. The Augenblick, the instant or moment, is an encounter with 
one’s own temporal finitude and, as such, potentially a break in which decision and 
individuation can occur. Yet human existence is not only challenged by its present. 
Being related to a past that cannot fully be mastered and a future that is not simply 
a reproduction of its own present, the identity of lifeworld and common sense are 
9 Interestingly, the question of naming difference remains deeply problematic for Heidegger. See, 
for example, Peter Trawny’s investigation of the “inappearance” or “invisibility” (Unscheinbarkeit) 
of difference in Heidegger’s thought. Trawny’s essay explores the complexity of difference, the 
multiple ways in which difference is enacted, in Heidegger’s thought. Difference is itself no longer 
difference when it is understood, according to the logic of identity, as a first principle or ground. 
This presents Heidegger with the impossibility of identifying and naming difference, since differ-
ence as difference withdraws and withholds itself. Peter Trawny, “Die unscheinbare Differenz.” 
Phénoménologie Française et Phénoménologie Allemande, ed. E. Escoubas and B. Waldenfels 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000), pp. 65–102.
10 Kenneth Maly, Heidegger’s Possibility: Language, Emergence – Saying Be-ing (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2008), p. 85.
11 T. W. Adorno, “Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens,” in GS 
14: Dissonanzen; Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie (Frankurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2003), p. 18.
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always implicitly questionable. Everyday existence avoids such questionability in 
its “flight” from this unknown past and unknowable future, because exposure to this 
temporality, to the ecstatic character of time, throws its self-certainty and self-
understanding into question.
Dasein is first of all to be understood out of the social indifference in which it is 
usually affected and moved. Yet, via the very affectivity and motility indicated in 
the self’s average everydayness, Heidegger articulated Dasein’s possibilities for 
understanding being and enacting its existence in its difference and singularity. This 
is done through the interruption of everyday indifference, which allows the release-
ment of the everyday. These interruptions occur through experiences of limits, 
which Karl Jaspers had described as “boundary situations.”12 These disruptions are 
not merely negative and inconvenient, but disclose the very character of existence in 
its facticity and possibility. The differentiation of existence occurs through the pos-
sibilities disclosed in the breaks and disruptions of everydayness itself. It is differ-
ence itself that reveals possibilities for the individuation of Dasein. Although alterity 
is hinted at in Jaspers’s notion of “boundary-situation,” it remains inadequate for 
Heidegger’s analysis of individuation insofar as it fails to enact the questionability 
of existence. As merely other, alterity and difference can always be reintegrated 
back into the indifference of everydayness, just as there is a kind of “newness” and 
apparent variety that is actually more of the same in contrast with the phenomeno-
logically new (GA 20, pp. 32–33).
Indifferent everydayness involves a repetition without difference and without 
renewal. The broken hammer can be replaced, anxiety can be forgotten, and the 
strangeness of the stranger can be integrated or excluded according to the norms of 
everydayness. Interruption alone cannot individuate the self, but rather how Dasein 
responds to interruption is the key to its individuation: Whether the break itself is 
recognized as such and its questionability intensified or whether it is excluded as 
nonsense – as the “nothing” is habitually disclosed in average existence – or – like 
death – integrated into the identity of everydayness. The questionability of such 
experiences and situations needs to be embraced and deepened if radical individua-
tion is to occur. This is why Heidegger emphasized the moment of being pushed and 
shaken (Stoß) in his description of the call of conscience: “In the disclosive ten-
dency of the call, lies the moment (Moment) of a push (Stoß), of an abrupt arousal 
(Aufrütteln). The call is from afar unto afar” (GA 2, p. 360). This being called is a 
being pushed and shaken in the call, since ordinary hearing does not listen to it. 
Dasein, as being-with others, can listen to others and does so in the manner of 
everydayness. The average self loses itself in the undifferentiated talk of everyday-
ness such that it hears yet fails to listen. Thus, according to Heidegger, Dasein “fails 
to hear its own self in listening to the they-self.” Lost in this average indifferent 
12 Heidegger developed the issue of death in proximity to Jaspers’ notion of “Grenzsituation” but 
increasingly differentiates them. See, for example, Der Begriff der Zeit, GA 64 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004), p. 48. I discuss the importance and inadequacy of Jaspers’ 
“boundary-situation” for Heidegger in “Questioning Practice: Heidegger, Historicity and the 
Hermeneutics of Facticity.” Philosophy Today, 44 (2001): 150–159.
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hearing, Dasein “fails to hear in that it listens away to the ‘they’” (GA 2, p. 360). 
The call of conscience interrupts ordinary hearing and discloses another possibility 
for hearing: “This hearing-to [or ‘listening away’ (Hinhören) to the ‘they’] must be 
broken, i.e., the possibility of another kind of hearing that interrupts it must be given 
by Dasein itself. The possibility of such a break consists of being called-onto 
(Angerufen) without mediation” (GA 2, p. 360).
The individuation of Dasein, which is in each case a being with others in the 
world, is not enacted in the everyday relationship between self and other. This rela-
tionship is itself usually characterized by the indifference of everydayness. Instead, 
this enactment occurs only when the questionability of existence in its being-with is 
enacted. It is precisely such experiences of interruption and uncanniness that indi-
viduate Dasein, when it hears the claim addressed to it in such experiences, and thus 
lets difference appear (GA 2, pp. 366–368, 372, 406–407).13
The call of conscience is a call by oneself onto being oneself. As such, it inter-
rupts the identity of everydayness to let singularity, responsiveness to it, and respon-
sibility for it, appear. Angst, however, does not proceed from and back to oneself 
insofar as it, as possibility, interrupts the very being of the self. Angst individuates 
in relation to the non-relational that can at any time strike (GA 2, pp. 250–251, 253–254). 
That is, it singularizes Dasein in regard to the ownmost (eigensten), non-relational 
(unbezüglichen), and unbeatable (unüberholbaren) possibility of its own death 
(GA 2, pp. 332–333). The unavoidable possibility of death confronts each thrown 
existence as its own death, as a death that addresses “me” by ending and thus radically 
placing into the question the very mineness of my existence. This possibility is non-
relational in that it cannot be ordered in the relationality of the world but places 
relationality itself into question. Death is not another relation; it appears as the relation-
less as such. Death appears as something that cannot be “outstripped” or “beaten.”
Dasein runs in after or away from death, yet it does not overcome the death it is 
expecting or avoid the death it is fleeing. Rather than being something Dasein can 
master, death masters Dasein each time. Death remains in its difference something 
that cannot be sublimated (unaufhebbar), mediated (unvermittelbar), and thought 
relationally (unbezüglich; GA 2, pp. 332–333).14 It indicates the fundamental 
thrownness into facticity of Dasein, and the limits of “transcendental-horizonal 
thinking,” which is an issue that Heidegger continues to return to and rethink in the 
Contributions to Philosophy.15 Dasein is incapable of conceptualizing or mastering 
13 The intersection of familiarity and unfamiliarity (proximity and distance) is already a topic in 
1919. The disruption of the familiar presupposes the stability of the familiar that is thrown into 
question. Compare, for example, Heidegger, Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 58 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992b), p. 251.
14 Compare David Wood’s argument that death and angst “make significance tremble” in Heidegger 
rather than being the naive virile mastery of death that Levinas suggested. The Deconstruction of 
Time, 2nd edition (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. xxiii.
15 Parvis Emad, “On ‘Be-ing:’ The Last Part of Contributions to Philosophy,” in C. Scott, et al., 
Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2001), p. 233.
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death, since death withdraws from being understood (GA 2, pp. 332–333). It is in 
this sense that the death of the other cannot be represented (GA 2, pp. 319–321). 
For Heidegger, it is only in the shadow of one’s own death in which this non-
relationality occurs and the nexus of worldly significance is broken.
At first, it seemed that average everydayness had the first and last word, and that 
interruptions could always be reappropriated and integrated back into the same. Yet, 
with the disclosure of fundamental non-relationality in anxiety, the direction of 
Heidegger’s analysis is reversed. It is not uncanniness and questionability that are 
derivatives of everydayness; it is everydayness that presupposes the uncanniness 
and questionability that it suppresses: “That kind of being-in-the-world which is 
tranquilized and familiar is a mode of Dasein’s uncanniness, not the reverse. From 
an existential-ontological point of view, the ‘not-at-home’ must be conceived as the 
more primordial phenomenon” (GA 2, p. 252). Heidegger would insist on the fun-
damental homelessness of “man” almost 10 years later in his Contributions to 
Philosophy: “Be-ing is the hearth-fire in the midst of the abode of the gods – an 
abode which is simultaneously the estranging of man (the ‘between’ [das Zwischen] 
in which he remains a (the) stranger, precisely when he is at home with beings)” 
[GA 65, pp. 486–487/343].16 Existence is primordially strange and foreign, we do 
not even know what “man” – or “the human” – is (GA 29/30, p.10), and we remain 
strangers to ourselves (GA 29/30, p. 6). It is not the identity and indifference of 
everydayness that is primary. Singularity and difference are constitutive of Dasein 
through its openness as well as its uncanniness and questionability. The self is each 
time a question to itself.
4  Dasein and Its Other
Levinas criticized the primacy of one’s own death in Heidegger and proposed an 
alternative approach in which the death of the other always takes precedence.17 
Is there not after all a testimony of/to the other in her death, one that suggests the 
ethical relation to the other rather than absorption in the egoism of self-concern? 
One could even formulate Levinas’s point in a way such as to alleviate some 
“Heideggerian” concerns: Could there not be a testimony to the other that is outside 
16 Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie: (Vom Ereignis), GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1989). Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, trans. Parvis. Emad and 
Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).
17 Heidegger’s presence haunts Levinas’s thought such that it is frequently present even when 
Heidegger is not explicitly discussed. Levinas’s most extensive discussion and critique of Heidegger 
on issues such as death can be found in his later work God, Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). Also, compare the discussions of Levinas and 
Heidegger by Berasconi, Raffoul, and Wood in Addressing Levinas. Edited by Eric Sean Nelson, 
Antje Kapust, Kent Still (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005).
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of the conceptuality and relationality of representational thinking; could there be a 
witnessing that does not undermine the non-relationality and non-identity of the 
other’s death as in each case its own? This last question raises the point of Heidegger’s 
reference to Tolstoy: “In his story ‘The Death of Ivan Ilyich’ Leo Tolstoy has 
presented the phenomenon of the disruption and breakdown of having someone 
die” (GA 2, p. 338n). A simple statement, yet one that indicates that testimony and 
witnessing are not necessarily the average everyday response to the death of the 
other, although they can occur through the disruption and breakdown.
The “ownmost” of death is not possessiveness and its “mineness” is not egoism, 
since possessiveness and mineness indicate that they are questions for oneself 
(myself) that place oneself (me) into question and not some other person some-
where else. Perhaps, following the structure of care, one needs to see one’s own 
death in order to care for the other’s death, since this breaks the uncaring indiffer-
ence of everydayness that does not care for the self or the other. In that sense, it is 
more than the recognition of not being able to live the other’s death. Death places 
me into question, addresses me as a question, precisely by being my death. If death 
escapes representation and relationality, the other’s death can be a question for me 
although I do not experience or live-through what it was like for her from her per-
spective. This is because death is a limit to experience rather than some content that 
could be reproduced from one mind to another. It is mine in that it occurs to every 
“I” each time alone. It is not mine in the sense of a possession that I control since it 
controls me. Dasein does not possess itself in death but is, on the contrary, “shat-
tered” (GA 2, p. 509). Heidegger would transform this claim in his Introduction to 
Metaphysics, where he described how the human being, who responds to the vio-
lence of being through violence, shatters on death (GA 40, p. 167/168), and contin-
ues with the claim that the violence-doing of human Dasein “must shatter against 
the excessive violence of being” (GA 40, p. 171/173).18 Heidegger also commented 
in his Contributions to Philosophy on the role of understanding and its being shat-
tered in Being and Time: “But understanding of being is throughout just the oppo-
site, nay even essentially other than making this understanding dependent upon 
human intention. How is being still to be made subjective at that place when what 
counts is the shattering of the subject?” (GA 65, pp. 455–456/321).
The self cannot have itself then as a possession or consolidate itself as “the Self,” 
according to Heidegger, since it is already thrown into a world in which it is not the 
center and in which it is being decentered. Dasein is not only ek-static, it is essen-
tially decentered or “ek-centric” (GA 27, p. 11). Even if Levinas’s objection is 
unconvincing, the problem runs deeper. Dasein is not an identical subject that can 
only be interrupted by another. Dasein is already distant and foreign to itself, such 
that the alterity and difference of uncanniness constitute its very mode of being. 
Dasein is thrown into facticity not as a general self or subject (GA 27, p. 5) but as 
18 Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, GA 40 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1983). For an English translation, see Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and 
Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
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“each time” (je-weilig) and “in each case its own” (je-meinig). It is therefore one’s 
own death, not the death of the other, which indicates the most radical alterity and 
singularity. Being-there is in each case “my own” each singular time without subli-
mation, mediation, or relationality (i.e., Unaufhebbarkeit, Unvermittelbarkeit and 
Unbezüglichkeit).19 Death as the most extreme possibility determines the facticity of 
existence.20 As facticity, it cannot be overcome or withstood.
Dasein is constituted as being outside of itself and outside in a world, existing as 
thrown beyond itself as ek-static and outside itself as ek-centric (GA 27, p.11), 
which literally means being out of orbit. The self of Dasein is then both near and 
distant to itself. This familiar and unfamiliar self occurs in and through everyday-
ness and the individuation of uncanniness. Individuation as Vereinzelung is a singu-
larization through the interruption of the identity of the “they,” the opening of the 
difference that Dasein already is as each time its own. Yet, this singularization of 
Dasein as thrownness in a specific situation does not necessarily imply isolation if it 
brings Dasein into the entirety of its relations in the midst of beings (GA 27, p. 334). 
The separation and solitude of individuation might be isolating but this does not 
by itself make it egoism or solipsism.
One can describe Being and Time in terms of an inappropriable connectedness, that 
is, a contextuality that centers, decenters, and recenters human existence. In this rela-
tionality, including its “relation” to the non-relational, Dasein is both dependent and 
free in its relations to things, others, and the world. The relation to the other exempli-
fies this inappropriable relationality in that Dasein cannot take the place of the other. 
The other’s existence withdraws from appropriation insofar as it is each time and in 
each case its own. Thus, “I am never the Dasein of the other, although I can be with 
him.”21 For Heidegger, “time is the principle of individuation” and Dasein is its own 
way of being its time.22 Dasein is inherently singularizing from the start, since it is its 
time. It is temporal. It is not only in the moment but is each time its moment.23
19 See François Raffoul’s analysis of the “each time mine” of Jemeinigkeit in his Heidegger and the 
Subject (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1998), 215–221. Also, compare John van Buren’s account 
of haecceitas in the context of difference, facticity, and singularity in Heidegger’s habilitation on 
Duns Scotus. The Young Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 105–107.
20 Heidegger already connected facticity and death in 1924. See, for instance, GA 64, p. 51.
21 I cannot be the other but only be with her, this entails that Dasein cannot overcome the asym-
metry of self and other. This not due to the “irrationality of lived experience” or “the limitedness 
and uncertainty of knowledge” but is constitutive of the way of being that Dasein is (GA 64, p. 47). 
The alterity seen by Levinas in the death of the other does not have the same power for Heidegger. 
Rather than placing the self into question, the other’s death is indifferently reintegrated according 
to the maxim that “one dies” (GA 64: 49). However, as in his examination of The Death of Ivan 
Ilyich, Heidegger’s description of such indifference does not entail that he is advocating it.
22 GA 64, pp. 57, 82–83.
23 Compare Frank Schalow’s analysis of temporality as diversity and plurality in Heidegger in his 
article “Decision, Dilemma, Disposition: The Incarnatedness of Ethical Action,” Existentia 12/3–4 
(2002), especially pp. 249–250. I would argue in addition that this follows Heidegger’s early strategy 
of the formal indication of facticity: Ontological difference opens up the plurality of ontic differ-
ence, time the singularity of the moment.
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In the relation of Dasein to its other, it can attempt to take this away from the 
other by leaping in, taking over, “understanding better,” or it can promote the other’s 
individuation. Thus, Heidegger indicated a different kind of relation in which the 
other is to remain free. In solicitude or caring-for (Fürsorge) the other, as ownmost 
care, Dasein does not leap in for the other in order to take the other’s care away, but 
rather is affected by it in order to give it back to the other. Caring for the other in its 
“care” does not imply taking the other’s care away (abzunehmen), but instead means 
to overtake it (übernehmen) in order to return it (zurückzugeben). Insofar as Dasein 
leaps ahead for the other instead of leaping in, it does so for the sake of the other 
rather than for itself. It takes up the other not to appropriate her but precisely in 
order to bring her to her own being as care. Solicitude or caring for the other’s care 
is not the reduction of my responsibility to promoting the responsibility of the other 
instead of, for example, helping someone in genuine need. It is more than the moral 
minimalism of abstract individualism insofar as it indicates the possibility of a 
reciprocal individuation in which each has its own being, as freedom and care, 
promoted.
Individuation involves differentiating oneself from common life – in its average-
ness and fallenness – while taking up the responsibility of sharing with the other 
from out of this difference. This difference is a between that separates and binds, 
suggesting that individuation cannot be fulfilled. It happens only out of its impos-
sibility. As Heidegger already argued in 1924, fallenness is constitutive of facticity 
(GA 64, p. 51). As such, it remains inappropriable. If Dasein never overcomes, 
much less outlasts, its confrontation with its own death, then authenticity can at 
most only be a modification of facticity: “The ownmost being of Dasein is what it 
is only insofar as it is unownedly owned, that is, ‘preserved’ in itself. [Ownedness] is 
not anything that should or could exist for itself next to the unowned” (GA 64, p. 81). 
Instead of transcendence being an otherworldly condition or the formation of an 
isolated sovereign individual, ownedness indicates an altered way of relating to 
one’s unowned everydayness. It is not to “shake off” tradition and everydayness, 
which is constitutive of the finitude of Dasein and thus inescapable, but to appropri-
ate it more primordially (GA 2, p. 291). Yet, as this appropriation is always related 
to the inappropriable, transcendence can only be a response to – and taking up of 
responsibility for – facticity. That is, freedom is taking up one’s responsibility in its 
facticity (GA 64, p. 54). If responsibility is inevitably each time one’s own yet 
enacted in relations with others, and freedom is a response to facticity (the awaken-
ing of possibilities in the facticity that one is), then ethics is always already the ethics 
of facticity.
The “giving back” of care also clarifies the idea of an inappropriable relatedness 
by revealing a relation in which the other is not mediated by one’s own but is pro-
moted precisely as being other than myself: “This solicitude which essentially per-
tains to authentic care; that is, the existence of the other, and not to a what which it 
takes care of, helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and free 
for it” (GA 2, p. 163). Heidegger clarified this “being-for-the-other” further in his 
1928/1929 lecture course Introduction to Philosophy. There, he described how 
the essence of being-with-one-another consists of being-open-for-one-another 
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(Für-einander-offenbar-sein), an openness for the other that allows reciprocity and 
its lack to be possible (GA 27, p. 88). As Heidegger later maintained, understanding 
(verstehen) is not an indifferent mutuality but a reciprocal placing into question. 
Understanding is not an encounter between two fixed positions that somehow 
remain unchanged in their communication, or concludes in conversion, but is dif-
ferentiation through addressing and questioning both oneself and the other out of 
care (GA 13, pp. 17, 20).24 Understanding is enacted through a confrontation and 
conflict in which the other places one’s own in question, and vice versa, transform-
ing those who engage in it (GA 13, p. 20). Understanding thus requires both (1) the 
long lasting will of listening to the other and (2) the courage to one’s own determi-
nation (GA 13, p. 21).
5  The Being-with of Dasein
Levinas and others have criticized Heidegger for subjectivism and individualism 
and argued that Heidegger’s thought is inherently unable to think the social and 
ethical.25 In response, I have argued that Heidegger’s work hints at an “ethics of 
facticity” or finitude in proceeding from an indifferent commonality to the possibil-
ity of individuation through the difference in/of experience itself. This individuation 
requires the unfolding of what Heidegger describes as conscience, freedom, and 
responsibility. Although Heidegger rejected the terms “ethics” for various historical 
reasons, it is clear that his project has an ethical dimension and significance. In addi-
tion, rather than excluding sociality, his account of individuation shows how it is 
uniquely possible as free from domination (i.e., taking the other over) and as pro-
moting the other’s Dasein as care, freedom, and responsibility.26
One should not forget that Dasein is “always already” being-with and that being-
with is a fundamental equiprimordial determination of the being of Dasein. The 
“with” occurs not because of identity or because Dasein is made alike but rather 
because of the “there” (GA 27, p. 137). Dasein encounters others and things in how 
they give themselves because it is the opening of the there (GA 27, p. 136). Because 
being-there is being-with, being-with cannot be derived from the idea of the subject 
24 Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910–1976), GA 13 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1983).
25 Levinas interprets Dasein as a fundamentally non-intersubjective subjectivity. See Bernhard 
Waldenfels, Phänomenologie in Frankreich, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), p. 236.
26 The owned (eigentliche) is related back to one’s own (eigene). Ownedness had an explicitly 
social as well as temporal dimension in the early1920s, since the relation to “one’s own” means 
opening up the possibilities available to one to individuate oneself “in one’s own time and genera-
tion” (PIA, p. 248): Heidegger, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der 
hermeneutischen Situation),” H.U. Lessing (ed.), Dilthey-Jahrbuch, 6 (1989): 237–69.
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(GA 27, p. 133), nor the self from the other (GA 27, p. 135), nor in the “I/you” relation 
that simply doubles the solipsistic subject (GA 27, pp. 141, 146). Sociality and com-
munity, and every form of “I/you” relation, are only possible because Dasein is 
each time in its own way already with others and is, as such, a being-with-others 
(GA 27, p. 141). Insofar as being-there is being-with-others, Dasein is always 
already spoken to and addressed by the other (GA 29/30, p. 301). The self, insofar 
as it listens to and hearkens to the other, is always already placed into question by 
the other and pulled out toward responsibility for the other in care: Care as care for the 
self inherently is bound to the care for the other. As owned, Dasein cannot step 
in, take over, and occupy its place but can only promote the other’s self-care. The answer, 
the binding responsibility that brings Dasein to choice and decision (WDF, p. 169), 
is care.27 Care discloses the difference of the average being-with of Dasein and the 
ownmost possibility of being-with, in which Dasein first stands in relations directed 
toward others.28
The question of community and individuation is not then a question of inferring 
a collective subject from an individual one or of deducing the individual from the 
collective. It is neither about an ahistorical and worldless self nor a social organism 
that allows no difference.29 Heidegger had already suggested this in his Winter 
semester 1921–1922 lecture course, when he made the case that the self-world is 
neither identical to the ego nor can it be isolated from being-with and the environing 
world (GA 61, p. 96).30 The question of being-with cannot be one of the phenome-
nological constitution or construction of being-with from out of one’s own self con-
sidered as an isolated ego or subject (GA 29/30, p. 302). Insofar as being-with is to 
be understood as a structure of everydayness, it too must be transformed in the 
modification of everydayness that occurs through individuation. Dasein is in each 
case my own such that I am never the Dasein of the other but only with the other. 
Consequently, Dasein never becomes the other but is rather individuated in such a 
way that in becoming itself, it becomes otherwise than itself and in becoming oth-
erwise than itself singularly becomes itself. Individuation is not a closed isolated 
process such that the nearness to the “they” would be lost. Dasein cannot comport 
itself as being-with without listening to the “they” and without cultivating its ability 
27 WDF: Heidegger, “Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf um eine 
historische Weltanschauung. 10 Vorträge.” Dilthey-Jahrbuch, 8 (1992–93): 143–180.
28 Dasein is, as Nancy and Raffoul have established, a singular-plural indication. See Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Being Singular Plural. Translated by R. Richardson and A. O’Byrne (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 6–7 and Raffoul, 1998: 215–221. Bringing into consideration Kisiel and 
van Buren’s work on the logic of formal indication only strengthens this argument. See Theodore 
Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1993) and van Buren, 1994: 324–347.
29 Heidegger not only rejected the idea of a “worldless ‘I’” but also would later criticize the more 
dangerous shapes in which this worldless subject is absorbed into “something greater,” such as life 
or the Volk (GA 65, p. 321/225; also compare IM: 54/74).
30 Heidegger, Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, GA 61 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1994).
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to hear beyond what is usually and for the most part said in order to achieve a 
responsive hearing that takes into consideration a being-with the other that is also a 
being-for the other (GA 2, pp. 163, 217). Responsiveness thus implies responsibility, 
and, yet, it cannot occur without the confrontation and conflict with the other for the 
other (GA 27, pp. 22–23, 327).
6  Being-with others and the Responsiveness of Hearing
Following the interpretation staked out in the previous sections of this paper, 
Heidegger did not turn to the question of the self or self-sameness to the exclusion 
of the other as well as the alterity of the world and one’s own self. The individuation 
of Dasein in its being-with unfolds through hearing. This does not occur as a pro-
cess of identification or empathy, but rather it only occurs through differentiation 
and becoming other. All understanding is therefore in this sense differentiating con-
frontation (Auseinandersetzung). Dasein transforms itself in its being-with precisely 
through the responsibility for the other in encountering and individuating the other. 
Individuation signifies more than recognition of difference and alterity. Individuation 
and differentiation occur not as a progressive teleological development but through 
one’s own questionability and uncanniness. Heidegger’s thinking is thus a questioning-
answering responsiveness in relation to the facticity of the thrownness of Dasein. 
The historicity of thrownness into one’s own generation and world signifies the 
impossibility of a pure responsiveness that would occur without interruption and 
conflict, without the historicity and destiny in which Dasein finds itself. This implies 
that Dasein cannot recognize another, and by implication translate, without differ-
entiating itself and its other. Difference occurs not as indifferent lack of contact and 
isolation but rather, as a turning of language through the word, as and in the crossing 
of the between.
Dasein is frequently referred to by Heidegger as an originary unified phenome-
non, but this unity belongs to difference itself. For example, in the late 1920s, 
Heidegger described it as the transcendence of Dasein in its nothingness and lack of 
bearing (GA 27, p. 354). Dasein is thus in each case already betrayed and endan-
gered in its transcendence-in-the-world (GA 27, p. 358). It belongs to “the each 
time of the facticity of transcendence” (GA 27, p. 367). As such, humans do not first 
of all observe and inquire. Human Dasein understands others and “intuits the world” 
through encounter and confrontation (GA 27, pp. 367–368, 382–390). Ontological 
difference is not the monistic closure but opens up the radical diversity of ontic 
differences in being its formal indication, which is not only a phenomenology 
of phenomena but a hermeneutics of reading, interpreting, and translating texts.31 
31 On the hermeneutical context and character of formal indication, see E. S. Nelson, “Questioning 
Practice,” 150–159; and “Die formale Anzeige der Faktizität als Frage der Logik,” in Alfred 
Denker and Holger Zaborowski, eds., Heidegger und die Logik (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Editions 
Rodopi BV, 2006a), pp. 31–48.
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The hermeneutic circle in its openness and deferral is already explicated as a 
movement of translation in Dilthey, for whom transposition between self and other 
operates as translation and retranslation.32
More radically, ownedness is not a psychological category in Heidegger. The 
authenticity of existence, as a communicative enowning, is only possible as address-
ing and being addressed, hearing and responding; that is, as a responsive hearing of 
the other. Heidegger therefore claims in Being and Time that “Listening to … is the 
existential being-open of Dasein as being-with for the other. Hearing even consti-
tutes the primary and resolute openness of Dasein for its ownmost possibility of 
being, as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it. 
Dasein hears because it understands. As being-in-the-world that understands, with 
others, it ‘listens to’ (hörig) itself and Mitdasein, and in this listening (Hörigkeit) 
belongs (zugehörig)” to these (GA 2, p. 217). Listening to others is a belonging to 
them. Yet, there could be no belonging as listening without difference, since other-
wise nothing would need to be said or communicated. The necessity of language is 
based in the non-identity of its participants. Since Dasein listens to Mitdasein (the 
being there of the other in all of its facticity and possibility) in addition to itself, it 
cannot simply be a listening to oneself. Despite the fragmentary character of Being 
and Time and the undeveloped character of Mitsein, being-with as constitutive of 
Dasein’s existence is repeatedly implied.
Human existence always already belongs to others; it is already with others in the 
world as a common significant with-world, out of which it understands and acts. 
Hearing and listening inform and attune a comportment that is directed toward the 
other, insofar as Dasein is open for the world in standing out in the world, that is, is 
ecstatic (GA 2, p. 218). This means that the question is not whether but how we go 
along with and do not go along with others, and how the alterity of the other can be 
recognized. Heidegger answers this question by pointing toward the possibility of 
genuine hearing. This hearing and hearkening indicate the passivity of a letting 
occur. Both are necessary conditions for a responsive relation with the other. This 
problematic will be transformed through what Heidegger calls the “turning in 
enowning” (die Kehre im Ereignis) [GA 65, p. 407/286]. The listening confronta-
tion occurs out of the “between” (Zwischen) and the place (Ort) of de-cision 
(Ent-scheidung), as the answer and question concerning the violence and uncanni-
ness of the human. Heidegger explored in his Introduction to Metaphysics this nexus 
of address and conflict, of logos (lógoV) and polemos (pól∈moV). More acutely, 
later in the decade, Heidegger thinks enowning (Ereignis) beyond agon (άgώn) and 
32 W. Dilthey, Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, second edition. 
Ed. B. Groethuysen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), p. 120. Interpretation is never 
exclusively of an author, or his or her intentions, and therefore cannot be translation in the sense of 
a psychological or reproductive copying in that it already involves language, and history, as well as 
psychology for Dilthey.
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polemos (pól∈moV), as the primordial difference (Austrag) and strife enacted 
between gods and humans, world and earth.33
Heidegger addressed in “Wege zur Aussprache” the possibility of interpretive 
confrontation (verstehende Auseinandersetzung). Heidegger is concerned here 
with a recognition of the other, which does not forget the question of difference 
between self and other. This is understood as a conflict (Streit), not for the sake of 
strife – much less for the so-called “struggle for existence” – but for understanding 
the other (GA 13, pp. 15–21).34 This is because difference (Unter-schied) is 
announced in hearing.35 For Heidegger, “we can truly hear only when we are hear-
kening” (GA 40, p. 138). We can only hearken when we are responsive to what is said. 
Responding, however, is something barely heard in the word “correspondence” 
(GA 40, p. 132). Correspondence, and accordingly translation as a co-responding, 
calls for being thought from out of the context of being claimed and responding to 
that claim. In this sense, Heidegger is articulating another fundamentally different 
kind of hearing that would be responsive to word and thing. But, to tweak a state-
ment of Heidegger, we are not simply inexperienced in such hearing; our ears are 
overcome by what prevents responsive hearing and interpretive confrontation 
(GA 40, p. 138).
7  Listening and Difference
Wenn keiner mehr wirklich reden kann, dann kann gewiß keiner mehr zuhören.— 
T. W. Adorno36
Verständigung im eigentlichem Sinne ist der überlegene Mut zur Anerkennung des je 
Eigenen des anderen aus einer übergreifenden Notwendigkeit.—Martin Heidegger 
(GA 13, p. 16).
Heidegger explicated the possibilities of the self’s being responsive to others, 
the world, and itself. This complicates the question of the relationship between 
33 For instance, Metaphysik und Nihilismus, GA 67 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1999), p. 77. Also see GA 65, p. 510; tr. 359. I develop this account of logos (lógoV) and polemos 
(pól∈moV) in the context of questions of suffering and violence in “Traumatic Life: Violence, 
Pain, and Responsiveness in Heidegger,” in Kristen Brown and Bettina Bergo, The Trauma 
Controversy: Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Dialogues, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009).
34 Despite Heidegger’s rejection of the pseudo-Darwinistic notion of the “struggle for existence” 
(Kampf ums Dasein), Levinas reduced his agonistic thinking to it as discussed by Robert 
Bernasconi, “Levinas and the Struggle for Existence” in E. S. Nelson, A. Kapust, K. Still, eds., 
Addressing Levinas (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005).
35 Note the following discussions of the significance of hearing in Heidegger, Heraklit, GA 55 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), pp. 238–260; pp. 162–163, of Charles Scott, 
“Zuspiel and Entscheidung: A Reading of Sections 81–82 in Die Beiträge zur Philosophie.” 
Philosophy Today, 41 (1997): 161–167; and Peter Trawny, Heideggers Phänomenologie der Welt 
(Freiburg: Alber, 1994), pp. 90–96.
36 T. W. Adorno, GS 14, 15.
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Heidegger’s philosophy and his involvement in National Socialism, because the 
quick explanations of this seem inadequate to his thought and his action. In this 
sense, the critiques of Habermas and Levinas have failed to meet the challenge and 
complexity of the question. Heidegger had already in his early and later work placed 
the philosophy of identity and totality radically into question. Ontology, which is 
always the destructuring of ontology for Heidegger, is to be understood from out of 
its difference, that is, the ontological difference between beings and being, and as 
the openness. But despite Heidegger’s use of this language, perhaps he did not go 
far enough since he did not develop the ethical import of this difference and open-
ness. If we consider Levinas’ alternative to Heidegger’s thought, rather than his 
criticism, the question emerges of why Heidegger did not take the step from respon-
siveness to the primacy of ethical responsiveness to the other. Is it then this ethical 
unthought that remains the questionability of his political activity in the 1930s?
Heidegger’s thinking, beginning in the mid-1930s, if only as an unsaid to be said, 
already bears the mark and trace of a confrontation with National Socialism, and 
thus with his own philosophy. The critique of modernity and the history of the West 
that began to emerge in the mid-1930s is not without its ethical and political impli-
cations.37 In his later thought, the themes we have considered in his work of the 
1920s will only become more pronounced: Heidegger himself will undertake the 
critiques of identity and presence that were later used to destructure his own thought. 
Yet, the question of difference is in Heidegger’s thinking also a question of the 
interdependence of the intercrossing and the between, a thinking from out of and to 
the middle that resists dialectic – which in resisting it cannot escape – and a mere 
opposition of identity and difference. Heidegger argued in “The Onto-theo-logical 
Constitution of Metaphysics” that the thinking of difference as difference and the 
“step back,” as opposed to recollection, characterizes his thought in contrast with 
Hegel’s. However, one can never completely escape the dialectic, and difference as 
difference always withdraws from being sayable and thinkable. As such, the think-
ing of difference as difference cannot escape the metaphysics of identity that it 
confronts. There is then no simple overcoming of metaphysics in which philosophy 
ends and thinking begins.38
Heidegger’s ontology, as the simultaneous critique and demystification of tradi-
tional ontology, signifies then the fundamental openness of being. Being is the 
opening of the between, the intersecting fourfold, and the openness of being is a 
claiming and being claimed of human life, that is, be-ing is that which essentially 
addresses and attunes our being in its fundamental capacity to hear. The forgotten-
ness (Vergessenheit) of this inapparent and withdrawing difference, that is, of differ-
ence as difference, belongs to difference itself (GA 11, p. 55). Difference can then 
37 On Heidegger’s thinking of history in the Contributions and related works, see E. S. Nelson, 
“History as Decision and Event in Heidegger.” Arhe, IV: 8 (2007), 97–115.
38 Compare John Sallis in “The End of Metaphysics: Closure and Transgression”: “The end of meta-
physics brings the very sense of end – hence its own sense – into question” in Delimitations: 
Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 17.
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not be used as a first principle or explanatory ground, since difference itself 
undermines these as difference. This questioning of being from out of the openness 
of be-ing occurs through the intercrossing of the between as responsive setting-apart 
and interpretive conflict, which cannot be mediated or sublimated. This conflict is 
neither negative nor subjective; it is not for Heidegger an agon (άgώn) of individuals 
nor the self-assertion of the will. According to the early Heidegger, the world 
is encountered in the communicative enowning of logos (lógoV), in addressing and 
being addressed; “The world is always encountered in a specific way of being 
addressed, in being claimed (lógoV)” (PIA, p. 241). Addressed and responding to 
this being claimed, Auseinandersetzung and Widerstreit occur through the world 
and the questioning that are constitutive for the understanding and attuned comport-
ment that is Dasein.
8  Concluding Words: Ethics and Translation
For the early Heidegger, logos (lógoV) means legein (lέg∈in), to speak, and speaking 
“is what most basically constitutes human Dasein”; speech, listening to Aristotle, 
“is a mode of the being of life” (GA 19, pp. 17–18). In his early lecture courses, 
Heidegger thinks existence as coming into one’s own in and through lógoV, in 
which lógoV is responsive enactment and letting be of phenomena instead of a uni-
versal category or identity that subsumes all particulars.39 This enowning of lan-
guage, of intersection and transversal allows difference and thus the performative 
need for translation to appear. Difference shows the fundamental questionability of 
communicative existence, which is both itself and not itself, and thus calls for inter-
pretation and translation.40 Since difference indicates the ownmost interruption and 
placing into question of one’s own, translation is a response to both the other’s and 
one’s own foreignness.41 Translation is not then a derivative or secondary use of 
language added on to a supposed first use of the native tongue. Unfolding within 
language itself, the task of translation arises from, and resides within “the ‘way 
making’ that comes to pass with each ‘saying.’”42
As Parvis Emad notes in “Thinking More Deeply into the Question of Translation,” 
“translation implies a crossing over and transposition.”43 Translation is a being under 
39 On the more extensive senses of lόgoV in Heidegger, which is no mere “logocentrism” in pri-
oritizing identity or universality, see K. Maly, Heidegger’s Possibility, pp. 42–45.
40 On the mutuality of interpretation and translation in Heidegger, see K. Maly, Heidegger’s 
Possibility, pp. 88–91.
41 On the foreign and the native, and translating one’s mother tongue, see Emad, “Thinking More 
Deeply,” pp. 324, 331; and On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 23, 26.
42 Emad, “On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy,” p. 40.
43 Emad, “Thinking More Deeply,” p. 324.
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way and a way making, as Emad indicates.44 Or perhaps, to reemploy the language 
of Heidegger’s earliest writings, it is individuation as explored in this paper. 
Existence is lived as language and logos (lógoV), the en-owning and en-acting of 
one’s own ex-istence through understanding, interpretation, and translation. 
Entangled amidst things with others in the world, factical existence enacts and artic-
ulates its life in dialogue (Zwiesprache). Self-interpretation and self-reflection, indi-
viduation and translation, belong to the very facticity of human existence rather than 
being something alien to or imposed on it. Yet, this translation does not consist in 
agency, much less in a set of techniques, rules, and prescriptions for going about 
translating. There is no “ethics of translation” in the sense of assigning norms or 
standards of correctness to, and then praising or blaming an isolated “Self.” 
Translation does not involve an ethics – in the conventional sense, but instead is a 
way of safeguarding and preserving the disclosive power of the word into which the 
speaker is thrown and which individuates itself in one way or another. Responsiveness 
to and responsibility for the word, which individuates it anew in order to address 
and encounter its matter, is the challenge of the translator, as Emad indicates so well 
in addressing the translator’s “hermeneutic responsibility.”45
Adopting Emad’s description of Heidegger’s transformative thinking in 
Contributions to Philosophy, it can fittingly be said that originary translation “is at 
the same time a turning of and in language.”46 Translation occurs not only within 
language, leaving the prevailing structure of language intact, but instead extends to 
the uttermost limits of what can be said. Responsible translation is, as Emad insists, 
a “happening of ‘de-cision’” within language itself.47 Such responsible translation, 
prevailing “in every conversation,” is “a response that lets language unfold its 
core.”48 Herein consists the “originality” of translation. Accordingly, in Emad’s 
words,
This means that it is language – and not the interpreter – that initiates, carries through, and 
completes originary translation.49
References
Adorno, T.W. 2003. Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens. In GS 
14: Dissonanzen; Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Bernasconi, Robert. 2005. Levinas and the struggle for existence. In Addressing Levinas, ed. E.S. 
Nelson et al. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
44 Emad, “Thinking More Deeply,” p. 329.
45 See P. Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, pp. 37–40.
46 Emad, “On ‘Be-ing,’” p. 243.
47 Emad, “On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy,” p. 3.
48 Emad, On the Way to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, p. 23, and “Thinking More 
Deeply,” p. 332.
49 Emad, “Thinking More Deeply,” p. 332.
289Individuation, Responsiveness, Translation: Heidegger’s Ethics
Dilthey, W. 1956. In Der Aufbau der Geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, 2nd ed, 
ed. B. Groethuysen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Emad, Parvis. 1993. Thinking more deeply into the question of translation: Essential translation 
and the unfolding of language. In Martin Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. John Sallis. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Emad, Parvis. 2001. On ‘Be-ing:’ The last part of contributions to philosophy. In Companion to 
Heidegger’s contributions to philosophy, ed. Charles Scott et al., 229–245. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.
Emad, Parvis. 2007. On the way to Heidegger’s contributions to philosophy. Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. 
New York: Harper & Row.
Heidegger, Martin. 1977. Sein und Zeit, GA 2. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, Martin. 1979. Heraklit, GA 55. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, Martin. 1983a. Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (1910–1976), GA 13. Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, Martin. 1983b. Einführung in die Metaphysik, GA 40. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann.
Heidegger, Martin. 1989. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der herme-
neutischen Situation). Ed. H.U. Lessing. Dilthey Jahrbuch 6: 237–269.
Heidegger, Martin. 1989. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65. Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. 1999. Contributions to philosophy 
(from enowning). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1992a. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, GA 29/30. Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann. Trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. 1995. The fundamental 
concepts of metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1992b. Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 58. Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, Martin. 1992c. Platon: Sophistes, GA 19. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. Trans. Richard 
Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. 1997. Plato’s Sophist. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1992–1993. Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der gegenwärtige Kampf 
um eine historische Weltanschauung. 10 Vorträge. Dilthey-Jahrbuch 8: 143–180.
Heidegger, Martin. 1994. Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles. Einfhhrung in die 
phänomenogische Forschung, GA 61. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Heidegger, Martin. 1996. Being and time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 1999. Metaphysik und Nihilismus, GA 67. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann.
Heidegger, Martin. 2000. Introduction to metaphysics. Trans. R. Polt and G. Fried. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
Heidegger, Martin. 2001. Einleitung in die Philosophie, GA 27. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann.
Heidegger, Martin. 2004. Der Begriff der Zeit, GA 64. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Kisiel, Theodore. 1993. The genesis of Heidegger’s being and time. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
Levinas, Emmanuel. 2000. God, death, and time. Trans. Bettina Bergo. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Maly, Kenneth. 2008. Heidegger’s possibility: Language, emergence – saying be-ing. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press.
Nancy, Jean-luc. 2000. Being singular plural. Trans. R. Richardson and A. O’Byrne. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
Nelson, Eric Sean. Fall 2004. Responding to heaven and earth: Daoism, Heidegger and ecology. 
Environmental Philosophy 1(2): 65–74.
290 E.S. Nelson
Nelson, Eric Sean. 2006a. Die formale Anzeige der Faktizität als Frage der Logik. In Heidegger 
und die Logik, ed. Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski, 31–48. Amsterdam/Atlanta: Editions 
Rodopi BV.
Nelson, Eric Sean. 2006b. Questioning practice. In Heidegger und die Logik, ed. Alfred Denker 
and Holger Zaborowski, 150–159. Amsterdam/Atlanta: Editions Rodopi BV.
Nelson, Eric Sean. 2007. History as decision and event in Heidegger. Arhe IV: 8, 97–115.
Nelson, Eric Sean. 2009. Traumatic life: Violence, pain, and responsiveness in Heidegger. In The 
trauma controversy: Philosophical and interdisciplinary dialogues, ed. Kristen Brown and 
Bettina Bergo. Albany: SUNY Press.
Raffoul, François. 1998. Heidegger and the subject. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
Sallis, John. 1995. Delimitations: Phenomenology and the end of metaphysics. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.
Schalow, Frank. 2002. Decision, dilemma, disposition: The incarnatedness of ethical action. 
Existentia 12(3-4): 241–251.
Scott, Charles. 1997. Zuspiel and Entscheidung: A reading of aections 81–82 in Die Beiträge zur 
Philosophie. Philosophy Today 41: 160–167.
Stenstad, Gail. 2006. Transformations: Thinking after Heidegger. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press.
Trawny, Peter. 1997. Heideggers Phänomenologie der Welt. Freiburg: Alber.
Trawny, Peter. 2000. Die unscheinbare Differenz. In Phénoménologie Française et Phénoménologie 
Allemande, ed. E. Escoubas and B. Waldenfels, 65–102. Paris: L’Harmattan.
van Buren, John. 1994. The young Heidegger: Rumor of the hidden king. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
Waldenfels, Bernhard. 1998. Phänomenologie in Frankreich, 2nd ed. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Wood, David. 2001. The deconstruction of time, 2nd ed. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
